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Between the 1950s and the early 1990s the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) proved 
to be one of the most successful parties in western Europe if viewed from the perspectives 
of electoral support and holding office. The party consistently obtained over a third of the 
vote and on three occasions over 40 per cent. It was the major party of every governing 
coalition and provided the Prime Minister for every government except two until 1992. The 
principal reason for this persistence in office was the peculiarity of the Italian party system, 
and specifically the perceived need to exclude from power the largest communist party in the 
west, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which consistently obtained over a quarter of the 
vote and as high as a third. In this situation the DC, as the largest party, was compelled 
indefinitely to govern in coalition with allies from the centre and centre-left.1 The DC’s 
penetration and politicisation of the state as a result of this permanence in office has been 
well-documented: the party was a ’regime-party’ par excellence?
This point underlines the significance to Italy of the DC’s approach to European 
integration compared with other Italian parties. The lack of alternation in government gave 
the party a monopoly over key ministries and consequently over policy-making. Foreign 
affairs were no exception. Indeed, they were one of the areas where DC hegemony was most 
complete because of the fact that the ’blocked’ nature of the party system had an international 
dimension to it: the ideological cold war between East and West. Curiously, however, when 
one comes to analyse the DC’s foreign policy in general and its views on the European 
Community (EC) in particular, one finds an effective absence of the first and a bland and 




























































































with an explanation of this peculiarity because it is important to understanding the party’s 
approach to Europe and its performance in the EC. The second section then analyses the 
party’s official position in Europe, the developments in this position and internal divisions 
over the issue. The third section attempts to flesh out the DC’s position by looking at the 
sources of its Europeanism. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections evaluate the DC’s performance 
in Europe: firstly, in its role in the European Peoples Party (EPP) and the European 
Parliament (EP); secondly, in its role in Brussels as the main party of Italian government; and 
thirdly, in its action as the main parly of government inside Italy. It is argued that the DC’s 
Europeanism is flawed and that the nature of this ’flawed’ Europeanism represents a 
fundamental dilemma for the party. The conclusion assesses the prospects for this dilemma 
being resolved through the changes which the Italian political system is currently undergoing.
THE DC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
As argued above, the existence of a ’regime party’ signifies the integration of party and state: 
a party’s permanence in office makes it difficult to separate the policies of the party from 
those of the government, and invariably, it means that government policy is simply 
determined by the party. Yet, in the Italian case, while undoubtedly it has been difficult to 
separate the DC’s foreign policy from that of the government, it has not been the case that 
Italy’s foreign policy in the post-war period has been simply determined by the DC. On the 
contrary, the DC did not, until the 1980s, have proper organisational instruments for the 
conduct of foreign policy, and this was enhanced by a lack of interest in international affairs 




























































































and political apathy about foreign policy was not a characteristic unique to the DC, but was 
common to all of the parties, except the PCI.3 Moreover, this was partly a reflection of the 
parlous state of Italian foreign-policy making itself, which was long-noted for its weaknesses, 
if not its virtual non-existence.4 With no real independent objectives, foreign policy became 
dependent on the only two tangible symbols, NATO and the EC, and presence at high-level 
international meetings was regarded as more important than initiative-taking.5 Variations in 
foreign policy depended less upon the DC or the government than on upon the preferences 
and (often uncoordinated) activities of various individuals: the Prime Minister, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the minister for Overseas Trade and, at times, those (such as Enrico 
Mattei) in charge of the large state enterprises.
This resulted in what Antonio Pilati has described as a ’polycentric presence’ of the 
DC in matters of Italian foreign policy.6 The party’s influence was felt in a fragmented way 
according to the individuals occupying the key ministries, and the interests at work inside the 
party and government. At the same time, this ’polycentric presence’ could develop into a 
relationship of dependence by the party on those individuals according to the strength of their 
own commitments and the interests of the DC. One observer at the DC’s 1980 Congress, for 
example, berating the party for its lack of foreign policy, concluded that ’The foreign policy 
of the Christian Democrats is organised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; this is perhaps one 
of the most evident examples of the institutional integration of the DC’.7 In other words, the 
expected power-flow of the party-state relationship was reversed; and where the DC, as a 
party, did express preferences, those preferences were determined more by internal needs than 




























































































Under De Mita’s leadership in the 1980s the DC attempted to centralise control and 
improve the co-ordination of foreign affairs inside the party (through the establishment of an 
International Affairs section and a European Affairs Office).8 In 1984, the party, at its 16th. 
Congress, approved, for the first time in its history a substantial document embodying the 
DC’s view of the world and its perception of its own role in it.9 These changes were 
paralleled and enhanced by the emergence of a more active Italian foreign policy in the 1980s 
and the demands of a new wave of European integration.10 The effects of these changes, 
however, were limited. The basic characteristic of the DC’s post-war choice - a low-profile 
and underdeveloped foreign policy which would maintain the party’s internal consensus and 
its monopoly over power - remained substantially unchanged. The party’s approach to Europe 
should be understood in this context.
THE DC’S APPROACH TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The Official Party Position
In the post-war period, the DC’s approach to the European issue reflected, to a large extent, 
its apathy regarding foreign policy. Excepting the period under De Gasperi (whose 
Europeanism will be touched on below), the party showed little real interest in Europe. Party 
literature on the issue until the 1980s was virtually non-existent and the party showed no 
interest in developing new ideas in the area of Community policy.11 Yet, this did not mean 
that the DC was negative about Europe. On the contrary, of all Italian parties the DC has been 
one of the most consistently pro-European. An analysis of the party’s official position in the 




























































































economic and political levels during all the key decisions in the integration process: the 
creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1950s, direct elections to the 
EP in the 1970s and the moves toward economic and political union in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.12 The issue was never the cause of a major division inside the DC (although, 
as will be argued below, differences in emphasis can be noted) and the DC responded to the 
increasing importance in the 1980s of both the EC and Italy as actors on the international 
stage by placing itself in the vanguard of those supporting moves towards European union, 
as an analysis of its current position confirms.
At the economic level, the party is a strong supporter of the Single European Act 
(SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty, supporting the full opening of markets, including the capital 
market, greater integration of banking systems and creation of an economic and monetary 
union with a single currency by 1999. It is opposed to any notions of a ’two-speed’ Europe.
At the social and regional level, the party believes in greater action in the social 
sphere to combat unemployment and is therefore fully supportive of the extensive social 
programme embodied in the Maastricht’s effective creation of a European Social Community 
by eleven of the member states. It is also a strong believer in the idea of ’regional 
harmonization’, and is concerned that the creation of a single market may exacerbate the 
existing North-South divide in Europe. It therefore fully supports article 130 of the SEA 
which commits member states to reducing the disparities between regions through the use of 





























































































At the external level, the party supports the extension of Community competence into 
the area of foreign and security policy with implementing moves taken by majority vote. 
Finally, at the political-institutional level, the DC has long stressed the significance of 
political union embodied in the Treaties setting up the Community. Its view is that the slow 
progress made on the issue of political integration (compared with economic integration) is 
the result of inadequate institutional mechanisms, and that there is a real danger of a 
’democratic deficit’ arising from the transfer of powers from the nation-states to the 
Community level without a concomitant increase in democratic control at that level. The party 
believes that the Commission must have effective power to initiate and implement European 
policy and the Council must have decision-making powers free of the veto, meaning an 
extension of majority voting beyond the limited range of issues provided for in the SEA. 
Moreover, it believes that the EP must be the institution which retains overall democratic 
control, meaning an extension of its powers. The party therefore supports the powers granted 
to the EP by Maastricht to amend and veto certain Council acts, to scrutinize Community 
finances, to set up committees of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or 
maladministration, and to have the power of a vote of confidence over the Commission.
Overall, the DC is deeply critical of the inter-governmental method which has 
characterised the construction of the Community. Even the SEA (which was regarded by 
many as a milestone n the development of the Community) was judged by the DC to be a 
limited achievement, if not a mediocre product of the intergovernmental method. The party 
believes that member-states will be unable to work towards integration in a coherent and 
binding fashion in the absence of better institutional mechanisms and decision-making 




























































































of temporarily calling into question the integration process), reflected its long-standing 
position on Europe. At a conference held in 1990 on international themes Franco Maria 
Malfatti, then head of the DC parliamentary leadership, argued that the new European order 
could not be conceived of as a new era which should dispense with the two most significant 
constructions of the post-war period, the Atlantic Alliance and the EC:
"The EC, first and foremost, has not been made superfluous by the new order, 
but rather finds in it further confirmation of its value. This is why an 
acceleration of the integration process is needed, transforming the Community 
of the twelve with maximum speed into economic and monetary union...rather 
than leaving European union as a vague objective with no specification of how 
and when it will be achieved."13
Changes and Internal Variations in the Official Party Position
As argued earlier, open debate on foreign policy in the DC has rarely existed and interest in 
international affairs has been minimal. Nevertheless, behind the consensus differences - or at 
least nuances - in the DC’s Europeanism have been identifiable, and they have accounted for 
changes in emphasis in the party’s position at different times in the post-war period.
As already noted, the two pillars of the DC’s post-war foreign policy were the Atlantic 
Alliance and the European Community. Which of these pillars received priority in the 
immediate post-war period is still the subject of historical research and debate. The 




























































































the Atlantic Alliance was perceived to be the international cornerstone of the party’s internal 
support. There was, in LaPalombara’s words, ’an almost perfect symbiotic relationship 
between US international ambitions and a Christian democratic party’s search for internal 
hegemonic power’.14 Consequently, support for a united Europe was dependent on its 
compatibility with NATO, something which was not perceived to be a problem in the 
immediate post-war period.
Recent research has modified this thesis through a re-evaluation of the role of the post­
war leader of the DC, Alcide De Gasperi. It has been argued that De Gasperi’s priority was, 
in fact, the building of a European Community of nations and Italy’s adhesion to the Atlantic 
alliance amounted to a surrogate for the preferred European alternative. De Gasperi’s 
objective was to find a new power base for Italy since it was apparent that she would not 
recover her international position through the old order which had effectively disappeared. 
The objective was located within the broader context of west European countries needing to 
find a capacity for action which was independent from the USA and USSR, and he believed 
that the most effective new power base was a supranational Europe. Moreover, the solidarity 
of the Christian Democratic movement across Europe could ensure a leading role for the DC 
in the integration process, and help to boost its electoral support against its opponents.15 This 
did not mean, however, that De Gasperi was negative about the Atlantic Alliance:
’The Atlantic Treaty appeared to De Gasperi as a sort of shell - provisional in 
an elastic way and for an indefinite time - within which the European embryo 
would develop. The necessary degree of development having been reached, the 




























































































essential to the creation of European bodies, also of the military type. >16
De Gasperi was able to provide a coherence and force to the DC’s foreign policy 
which was never matched thereafter. Under his control, and helped by the particular 
international enironment, the DC’s ’Atlanticism’ and ’Europeanism’ were made compatible. 
For his successors, the potential - and rising - incompatibility of the two ideas became the 
principle source of tensions over foreign policy inside the party. Once the Cold War had 
declined in significance in the 1960s, the question of European integration became primarily 
an economic, rather than political, issue. With the failure of the Centre-Left (based on the 
entry of the Socialist Party (PSI) into government) and the electoral rise of the PCI, there was 
a growing belief amongst many that the solutions to Italy’s problems lay in rapid moves 
towards European unification, irrespective of the implications for the Atlantic alliance 
(supporters of this view were called autonumisti (autonomists)). This position was supported 
by large sectors of Italian industry. This was an anathema to the Atlanticists in the party for 
whom loyalty to America was a priority above all else, and who also identified dangers in a 
commitment to a Europe based on supranationalism which would, in all likelihood, be 
dominated by European parties of the left, and provide a further platform of influence for the 
PCI. The issue was further complicated by the emergence in the 1960s and 1970s of a 
’Mediterranean’ position in the party, primarily (but not entirely) from its traditional left. 
These members favoured closer collaboration with the Mediterranean and Third World states, 
which involved a distancing of the country from the Atlantic alliance and a more skeptical 
approach towards the idea of European federalism. Finally, the continued presence of 




























































































completed the range of views inside the party. Consequently, the 1970s witnessed an unusual 
level of debate inside the DC in which some members of the right set up their own anti­
federalist group, Europa 70." The strength of the right and of Atlanticism was seen in the 
early 1970s when, under a centre-right government led by Andreotti and Malagodi, Italy 
abandoned the European ’monetary snake’.
The extent of division inside the party, however, should not be exaggerated. Firstly, 
the tone of the debate was never anti-European but rather revealed skepticism by a few about 
the creation of a European federal state. The prospect of the DC as a party opposing the basic 
principles of the European Community was never likely. Secondly, the debate was never aired 
prominently in public; its main public effect was to cause more incoherence and reticence in 
the party over foreign affairs, leaving policy to be made by the DC ministers in charge. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, by the 1970s the combination of a shift in the debate from 
political to economic issues, the modernisation of the Italian economy in the 1950s and its 
subsequent crisis in the 1970s resulted in support for Europe inside the party coming 
increasingly from those members who believed in carrying through economic reform, 
supported by the more progressive industrial interests. This identification of Europe with a 
more stable and equitable economy was to prove important and lasting. It meant that - 
although the ’balancing act’ between ’Atlanticism’ and ’Europeanism’ always continued - 
when Italy developed, in the 1980s, a more independent foreign policy (i.e. more independent 
from the United States), the party’s pro-European elements could become more vocal. The 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the transformation of the PCI into a non­
communist party of the left reduced further the importance of the Italo-American link and 




























































































paper), the party’s Europeanism remains flawed by its inability to implement social and 
economic reform along the lines required by membership of a united Europe.
In short, despite apathy and lack of organisation in foreign affairs and the presence of 
some minor divisions over the issue, the DC’s programmatic position on Europe in the post­
war period has been unequivocally supportive. Explaining and identifying the exact nature of 
this Europeanism is best done through an analysis of its sources.
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE DC’S EUROPEANISM
The origins of the DC’s Europeanism lie in six interrelated factors, the prominence of which 
have changed throughout the post-war period.
International Status and Power
The EC has been viewed as an essential means of raising Italy’s, and the DC’s, international 
stature and power. The position of dc Gasperi in the immediate post-war period has already 
been noted above. If, as recent research has suggested, a united Europe was de Gasperi’s 
priority, the rationale behind it was clear: to raise Italy’s status in the international 
community, bringing her back into the fold of established and influential nations of western 
Europe.
Even if, after De Gasperi, the DC never again had the same coherence in its European 




























































































power (which, in turn, would buttress the DC’s own monopoly of power) has been ever 
present. As Maurizio Cotta notes, countries which already enjoy a high status in the 
international community stand to gain less from supranationalism than countries with a lower 
status: ’For the latter, joining a larger group may mean stepping at least indirectly (through 
the supranational union) into the ’big game’ of international politics’.18 Italy’s ambiguous 
position (i.e viewed as more significant than the small powers of Northern and Southern 
Europe but, at the same time, not regarded as a power ranking alongside Germany, Britain 
and France) has acted as an incentive for the DC to attempt to enter the ’big league’ through 
promoting further integration. This, to a large extent, explains the desire on the part of Italian 
governments to be hyperactive during the periods when they hold the leadership of the 
Community (via the presidency). Indeed, Italian support for an acceleration of the integration 
process after the unification of Germany was primarily motivated by the fear that Germany 
would lose interest in the EC and disrupt the balance in Europe generally through its 
increased political and economic weight. Hence, the DC wanted to tie Germany into a 
politically and economically united Europe through which lesser countries such as Italy could 
continue to exert their influence.19
Internal Stability
As a nascent democracy in the immediate post-war period the DC perceived the Italian 
republic as being unstable and facing the prospect of a long period of consolidation, with a 
risk of democratic breakdown. That risk was seen as emanating from two sources: first, 
internally, the existence of strong ’anti-system’ extremes (particularly on the left in the form 
of the PCI), whose exclusion from government was regarded as a priority; and second, 




























































































Italy could be tied into a framework which would make the prospect of an internal communist 
transformation of Italy less tenable, at the same time as constituting a form of defence against 
communism in the East. It should be stressed, however, that - as with the question of 
international status - this reasoning was inseparable from the concern with the power and 
electoral strength of the party which was its first priority. Rightly or wrongly, the DC 
perceived - or claimed to perceive - the fate of Italy as bound up with its own, and this acted 
as an incentive for it to place the maintenance of its own power over all other considerations. 
If a united Europe aided the party’s electoral struggle against the communist menace then it 
had to be supported at all costs.
Christian Democratic ’Doctrine’
Supranationalism has been quite compatible with the DC’s Christian doctrine which has 
generally always expressed hostility to the nation-state, particularly in the writings of the 
party’s founder, Don Luigi Sturzo.20 Indeed, many members of the DC became active in. or 
at least influenced by, the European Federalist Movement (founded in Milan in 1943), and 
the 1950s saw the party espousing clearly federalist ideals while being happy for its 
government to pursue a more pragmatic European line.21 These federal ideals tended to 
become submerged in the 1960s and 1970s to more pragmatic needs, yet party members have 
not hesitated to resort to what they regard as the essential Europeanism of Christian 
Democratic thought to justify their party’s credentials in Brussels.
Economic Factors
From the 1960s onwards economic factors began to have an increasing influence in 




























































































interests, rather than on a simple cost-benefit calculation for Italy and the party of further 
integration. Despite the skepticism shown towards the idea of a united Europe by small 
industry and agriculture in the immediate post-war period, once Italy’s ’economic miracle’ 
was under way the economic importance of the newly-founded European Economic 
Community (EEC) became apparent, particularly to large sectors of industry, which had a 
growing influence inside the party. Being primarily export-driven, the economic miracle was 
given a major boost by the EEC’s creation of a free trade zone, and the percentage of Italian 
goods exported to member-states rose from 23 per cent in 1955 to 29.8 per cent in 1960 and 
40.2 per cent in 1965.22 The visible gains for Italy were such that supporting further 
integration was natural for a party committed to free-trade.
The Inadequacies of Italian Policy-Making
From the 1970s economic factors took on a political or policy-oriented dimension. The 
economic crisis of the 1970s exposed the inadequacies of the Italian political system and a 
policy-making process where institutional inefficiency, ideological conflict and the prevalence 
of distributive interests resulted in incoherent economic policies and a growing budget deficit, 
which the brief recovery in the 1980s did nothing to reverse. The EC and the economic 
commitments involved in further integration (particularly for European Monetary Union 
(EMU) to occur) were seen as a means by which harsh and unpopular economic measures 
could be legitimised and carried through. This became significant in the 1980s when real 
economic reforms were required to keep pace with other members of the EC. Giovanni Goria, 
for example, (the DC Prime Minister in 1987-88) stated openly that he welcomed the 
economic constraints of the EC as a means of overcoming powerful domestic interest hostile 




























































































for relegating Italy to Europe’s ’slow lane’.24 Indeed, this factor intertwines with the first 
factor (the loss of status and power) to create a daunting spectre which is used prominently 
in political debate.
Italian Public Opinion
The reason why the spectre of relegation to Europe’s ’slow lane’ can be used so prominently 
is because of the popularity of the EC with the Italian people. As regular surveys of 
Eurobarometer and Doxa polls since the 1970s demonstrate, Italy has consistently been one 
of the nations most favourable to the EC both in the form of general support for the idea of 
the EC and specific support for increasing the power of European institutions such as the 
EP.25 In the period since the Italian left (and particularly the PCI) began to shift its position 
on the EC the consensus has been a broad one: from the general public to the media, interest 
groups, political parties and parliamentarians. As David Hine has commented,
’If a major element of European integration is the creation of a domestic 
political climate supportive of integration, ...[Italy’s]... record is almost 
unimpeachable. It is the one country in the European Community where 
governments feel a constant pressure from Parliamentary opinion to be more 
incisive and more committed to the integration process.’26
The DC, both in its role as a party in parliament and as the major party of 
government, has felt these pressures for support of the EC. Like other Italian parties, it has 




























































































To summarise, the sources of the DC’s apparently unqualified public commitment for 
European integration seem clear. Whether or not Europeanism has been part of a Christian 
Democratic ideal, it has certainly been influenced and shaped by the DC’s monopoly of 
government. Europeanism has been an important element of the DC’s nature as a ’regime 
party’ and, at the same time, the party has been happy to let its specific policy developments 
in the European arena to be shaped by DC ministers and governments. This is not to suggest 
that the DC’s Europeanism has been purely instrumental in nature. But it does beg an analysis 
of the party’s actions in Europe. A party’s Europeanism is not judged solely by its 
programmatic position but also by its actions at the European level. Have the DC’s actions 
matched its apparent commitment to the European ideal? The next three sections will look 
at the DC in the EPP and the EP; the action of DC governments externally (in Brussels) to 
further the integration process; and the action of DC governments internally (in Italy) to 
further the integration process.
THE DC IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EUROPEAN PEOPLES’S PARTY
The DC is a member of both of the organisations which are the institutionalised expressions 
of the Christian Democratic movement in Europe: first, the European Union of Christian 
Democrats (EUCD), and second, the European People’s Party: Federation of Christian 
Democratic Parties of the European Community (EPP). The EUCD encompasses Christian 
Democratic parties from all European countries, and was founded in 1965. It has 28 member 
parties as well as 11 with observer status. The EPP (of relevance to this paper) is a 




























































































It developed out of the EUCD as a federation of EC Christian Democratic parties in 1976. 
The grouping is the second largest in the EP and consists of all Christian Democratic parties 
of the member-states plus Greece’s Nea Demokratia (which joined in 1983), Spain’s Partido 
Popular (1991) and the British and Danish conservative parties (1992) (although the last two 
are not, as yet, members of the federation itself).28
Of the three EC federations, there is little doubt that the EPP has been the most 
strongly and consistently pro-European and active in the cause of furthering integration. Its 
Basic Programme states that ’the EPP calls for the gradual - but resolute - transformation of 
the European Community into a genuine political union on a federal model...’ and that ’A 
federal Europe is now more than ever a necessary and realistic political objective’.29 To 
reinforce this view the party produced at its VII Congress in 1988 a five year ’Action 
Programme’ by which this goal could be achieved.30 The party has also attempted to deepen 
the theoretical links between Christian Democracy and European integration.31 Finally, of 
the three existing federations, the EPP is the most federally (or supranationally) organised, 
an institutionalised expression of its commitment to a federal Europe.32
The DC has been one of the most consistently active components of the EPP and the 
EPP (or CD) Group in the EP. The DC is currently the largest component of the 
parliamentary group (with 26 members), excepting the British Conservatives (who are not yet 
members of the federation). The DC component has been one of the strongest supporters of 
European integration in the EP with DC MEPs according priority to their role in the EC over 
national and local concerns.33 The DC has also been active in attempting to mould a 




























































































European union. The main conflict inside the EPP has been over its ideology and programme 
and the Italian component has been one of the principal protagonists in this conflict. The DC 
has consistently fought for a party whose Europeanism is founded on two principles, 
’Christianity’ and the ’social market economy’. This vision has tended to be restrictive 
towards European conservative parties with aspirations to join the EPP, an opening parties 
such as the German Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU) have always favoured. When the EPP 
was launched, for example, the DC wanted the word ’Christian’ included in the title of the 
party which was opposed by the CDU-CSU for fear of alienating conservative parties (the 
party’s sub-title, ’Federation of Christian Democratic Parties of the European Community’, 
represents a form of compromise). In election manifestos the DC has always opposed the idea 
(dear to the Germans) of constructing an ’anti-socialist’ bloc (partly because of its more 
progressive vision of the EPP but also because of the importance of the Italian Socialist Party 
to its continued permanence in office at the national level).34 The DC opposed the adhesion 
of the Christian Democrats to the European Democratic Union (EDU), the conservative bloc 
launched in 1978, and subsequently opposed the entry of the British and Danish conservative 
parties to the EPP in the early 1990s, because of their opposition to a federal goal and their 
skepticism with regard to the idea of a social market economy.35
There are few tensions existing between the party in the EP and the party at the 
national level. Indeed, in all of the direct elections to the EP, the DC adhered to the election 
manifesto approved by successive EPP congresses (even though the subsequent campaigns, 
as in other countries, tended to be conducted according to national issues).36 The party has 
used those manifestos as ’umbrella’ platforms within which to develop election manifestos 




























































































own. Links between the national party and the EPP are provided by representation by Italian 
members of the EPP in the organs of the DC (there are no formal links between the DC 
national parliamentary group and the EPP Group in the EP). The head of the delegation of 
the DC in the EP has formal speaking and consultative rights in the DC’s Executive (which 
also engages in close political cooperation with the European Affairs Section of the Italian 
delegation in the EPP Group). A percentage of MEPs (in 1986, for example, 5 out of 27) 
have the same rights in the party’s National Council. At the party’s National Congress MEPs 
can be given guest status which is equivalent to that of national deputies and gives them 
speaking rights. EPP Group members who are members of a provincial party association have 
consultative rights on the DC’s Provincial Committee, and those who are members of a 
regional party association enjoy similar rights on the party’s Regional Committee and 
Regional Executive. Finally, all EPP Group members have speaking rights at the Regional 
Congress for the election of delegates to the National Congress.37
How effective these formal mechanisms are in representing the European level in the 
decision-making processes of the DC is open to question. Generally speaking, the national 
level is predominant in European affairs, even in the selection of candidates for European 
elections and the development of electoral platforms, but this is not to say that there is no 
input of any significance from the European level (the role of the EPP in the development of 
election manifestos has already been noted). Paradoxically, however, the influence that Italian 
members of the EPP might wield nationally depends less on their prominence at the European 





























































































THE DC AND EXTERNAL GOVERNMENT ACTION TO FURTHER EUROPEAN
UNITY
Sergio Pistone argues that the European policies of successive Italian governments, nearly all 
of which have been directed by DC Ministers and received unequivocal support from the 
party itself, have been shaped by four tendencies which display more federalist traits than the 
European policies of any other member government during the post-war period:58
-first, the preference for a ’global’ form of integration incorporating political, military 
and economic aspects;
-second, the insistence on a strict link between ’positive’ and ’negative’ economic 
integration i.e. that economic integration should not occur solely through the removal of 
obstacles to the operation of a free market but also through the progressive unification of 
national economic policies and remedial action on the regional distortions created by the 
operation of a free market;
-third, support for the principle of the direct election of the European Parliament (EP) 
and a strengthening of its powers in the aim of a general démocratisation of the institutions 
of the EC;
-fourth, a preference for the participation of all forces and institutions in questions of 
European integration (rather than depending on the whims of intergovernmentalism), this with 
the aim of realising a European constitution of a federal nature.
These four traits are best summed up in two quotations. The first is the statement 




























































































Colombo faithfully implemented industry’s interests; his primary concern in formulating the 
first Community package on agricultural measures was to avoid any deadlock. The Italian 
delegation in Brussels came without a forceful or coherent strategy for Italian agriculture and 
was quick to sacrifice the interests of one sector of the economy for the apparent interest of 
the economy as a whole. Podbielski has noted that ’Italian negotiators were known in 
Community circles to have frequently put up a weak defence of the Italian point of view, to 
have adopted decisions too readily and uncritically and to have made concessions too 
quickly.’43 The CAP that was subsequently forged favoured (through its price-fixing 
mechanisms) support for Northern European type-products (grain, meat, milk, butter and 
sugar) to the neglect of those produced in Southern Europe such as Italy (wine, fruit, 
vegetables, olives and tobacco). Moreover, even when price support for so-called 
’Mediterranean’ products was later introduced, it was at a much lower level than those 
established for the first group of products.44 The negative impact on Italian agriculture, and 
specifically to agriculture in the south of Italy (the Mezzogiorno) was considerable and long­
term. Indeed, it helped maintain the disparities between the North and the South of Italy and 
between the latter and the other member states of the Community.45
The 1980s saw a marked change in the levels of Italian governments’ European 
activism. With Italy’s image abroad undergoing a considerable improvement Italian 
governments became more willing to take a proactive role. This is perhaps best illustrated in 
the DC’s handling of Italy’s hosting of the EC presidency in 1985 and 1990. The six month 
rotating presidency can (depending on the particular state of the integration process) provide 
individual countries with the opportunity to display their enthusiasm for European unification 




























































































’The essential core of Italian foreign policy is and remains European union’39; the second 
is by an Italian diplomat in describing the Italian government’s approach to the Maastricht 
Treaty: "We are saying yes to more or less everything."40 There is, however, an important 
difference in these two quotations which needs to be highlighted. The latter quotation suggests 
a pro-European stance which is more reactive than proactive and, in fact, aptly catches the 
attitude of successive Italian governments (at least until the mid-1980s). It underlines the fact 
that the DC (as the dominant party of government) has failed to impose any sort of coherence 
in Italian European policy and that its ’polycentric presence’ in foreign affairs has (when 
combined with the dominance of certain economic interests inside the party and the high 
levels of inefficiency in the state bureuacracy) inhibited the development of an Italian 
presence at the European level which has been able to match that of France and Germany.41 
This can be explained by the lack of proper foreign policy instruments in the DC, by the 
incoherence in DC policy produced by the attempt to support two ideas (Atlanticism and 
Europeanism) which were not always compatible and on which the party was not fully united 
and by the difficulties the DC has faced in exerting influence when, for a long time, the party 
was viewed by others as representing the ’sick man of Europe’.42
The effects of this negligence have at times been damaging to Italy’s economy and 
thus to the longer-term needs of the integration process. Perhaps the most striking example 
of this deficiency was in the negotiations over the setting up of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in the 1960s. The lengthy negotiations were managed by the DC under the 
leadership of Emilio Colombo. The party was, in these years, considerably influenced by 
Italian industry and its view that European integration represented a bonus tout court for the 




























































































1990 saw considerable activism on the part of Italian governments which was uncharacteristic 
for a country with a reputation for a low-profile foreign policy. Both presidencies saw the 
launching of intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) of considerable importance to the 
integration process.46 In particular, Italy has its place in the history books for having used 
its 1985 Presidency, in the face of strong opposition from Britain, Denmark and France, to 
force a vote on the issue of an IGC to consider amendments to the Treaty of Rome (the first 
ever use of a vote at a European Council meeting), from which emanated the Single European 
Act (SEA). Significantly, the origins of that initiative lay partly in domestic political 
competition, specifically over the European credentials of the Christian Democrat and 
Socialist parties. The Socialist Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, and the Christian Democrat 
Foreign Minister, Guilio Andreotti, sought to match each others’ achievements in the 
European arena, knowing the electoral benefits that would likely follow, and this is an 
important factor in explaining the determination of the Italians to force a vote on the issue 
of the IGC."
Nevertheless, the new Italian activism at the European level has not been without 
criticism. The persistent forwarding of ’maximalist’ positions hs been viewed as lacking in 
realism and too often insufficiently backed up with measures at the concrete level. This is 
most visibly the case with respect to governmental action inside Italy, an issue which will 
now be explored.





























































































David Hine has pointed out that, as the integration process deepens, it is no longer sufficient 
for parties, governments or countries to claim and extol their European credentials simply 
through initiatives and action in Brussels to further European unity:
’European integration has now reached a level that requires that domestic 
policy and domestic legislative programmes are adjusted to Community 
policies on a very broad front. Increasingly, European integration requires a 
measurable internal commitment from national governments and legislatures. 
Awareness of the demands of integration must also penetrate throughout each 
country’s system of public administration.’48
In other words, there is an internal, domestic dimension to pro-European action, which, 
if absent, can undermine the putative European credentials of a country’s external, supra­
national initiatives. There are, broadly speaking, two aspects to this domestic dimension, the 
political-legal aspect and the political-economic aspect.
The first aspect refers to the need for countries to ensure that Community law is 
implemented in their territories through translating EC directives at the EC level into national 
law and through compliance with the decisions of the European Court of Justice. The EC’s 
drive towards the achievement of the 1992 internal-market programme since the passing of 
the SEA highlighted the importance of this aspect. Yet, Italy’s record on both counts is 
extremely poor, indeed, one of the poorest across the member-states.49 The second aspect 
refers to the need for countries to adjust their economic and budgetary policies to the needs 




























































































a prerequisite to economic and political union. The importance of this was highlighted with 
the formal moves taken by the EC to achieve economic union, with the formulation in the 
Maastricht Treaty of tough convergence criteria for membership. Italy passes only one of the 
five criteria, the most alarming of which for the country is the stipulation that budget deficits 
should be no more than 3% of GDP for convergence to occur (Italy’s is nearer ten per 
cent).50 Despite the fact that the need for action was evident long before Maastricht, 
successive governments took no serious measures until after the elections of April 1992, since 
when the Amato and Ciampi governments (the latter headed by the ex-Govemor of the Bank 
of Italy) have attempted to reverse the trend. As Antonio Giolitti has noted:
’even though the Community was and still seems to be an essential foreign 
policy option for Italy, its governments hesitate to draw the consequences in 
terms of economic policy...rather than make a serious effort to overcome the 
divergences and its inferiority, Italy has sought recognition of [Community 
solidarity towards the "less affluent" countries] and compensation in the form 
of exonerations, exceptions, aid (or, if necessary, by defaulting and not living 
up to its commitments).’51
It might be added that, as noted earlier, the country has come to rely on the EC 
imposing discipline where its policy-makers cannot as the need for action has become more 
urgent. Certainly, serious measures will be required during the 1990s to bring the most 





























































































The DC’s failure to adapt Italy’s political, economic and legal structures to the 
demands of the integration process calls into question its European credentials and causes 
skepticism about the sincerity of its commitment amongst its allies. Can the proposals of one 
of the strongest proponents of EMU and political union be taken seriously when Italy’s 
economic and political system is a significant stumbling block to the achievement of these 
goals? A response to this question might be that it is erroneous to identify the lack of 
concrete action in these fields with only one political party: the DC. Raising this point 
reintroduces the importance of ’regime parties’ with which this 
paper began.
The issue is more profound and complex than simply assigning responsibility for 
Italy’s failures on the European front to the party which has dominated Italian government 
and policy-making in the post-war period. As indicated at the beginning of this paper it is not 
the case that Italian foreign policy has simply been determined by the DC. ’Regime parties’, 
particularly those which are present from the birth of a regime, are significant in the way in 
which they shape the political and economic system, and it is this perspective which is most 
relevant to the argument here. The DC’s hold on power in the face of a strong delegitimised 
communist opposition, and thus the absence of genuine alternation in government, gave the 
political and economic system its essential characteristics: unstable governments but a failure 
to renew the political and administrative class, the politicisation of the state, the ’sharing out’ 
(lottizzazione) of the top ministerial posts, the clientelistic use of state agencies located 
outside the parliamentary system of government, and the ’immobilism’ of successive 
governments in key policy areas such as health, welfare, education, the South and reforms of 




























































































according to political rather than economic criteria and the greater the level of distortions in 
the system the stronger vested interests became in its maintenance.53
To be sure, the DC was not the only party which enjoyed the fruits of this system, and 
nor can other factors (such as the inhibiting nature of the legalistic tradition of the 
administration54) be overlooked in evaluating Italy’s chronic inability to bring its economic 
and political structures up to the EC average. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, more than 
anything else, it is the ’centrality’ of the DC which has been at the heart of the system’s 
problems to meet the demands of European integration and, therefore, the DC’s removal from 
power is the main solution. This points to a dilemma at work in the DC’s Europeanism. To 
become a truly pro-European which acts in government in a way which matches its initiatives 
and the activity of its representatives in Brussels, the party needs to reform itself and the 
system which it has fashioned; yet, the achievement of both of these is not possible without 
the DC relinquishing power. Neither the party nor the political system can undergo genuine 
reform without the party first extracting itself from the state and going into a period of 
opposition. This explains why the failure to achieve this reform has been primarily due to the 
resistance of large sectors of the party. From this perspective the DC’s Europeanism must be 
regarded as deeply flawed.
The DC’s dilemma points to a deep paradox at work in its Europeanism. It was argued 
earlier that the DC’s Europeanism in the post-war period was an important element in the 
party’s monopoly of power. It can now be seen that that the type of Europeanism essential 
to its dominance was ’flawed’ and that the transition from ’flawed’ to ’genuine’ Europeanism 




























































































is seen most clearly in the European strategy pursued by the last DC-led government (April 
1991 - June 1992 under Andreotti). Andreotti’s policy aimed at achieving a deepening of the 
integration process which would give Italy (and thus the DC) more influence in (an 
increasingly federal) Europe, at the same time as anchoring the country to Northern Europe, 
specifically through the influence of the Franco-German axis in the EC. Andreotti viewed, 
therefore, any faltering in the integration process which raised the prospect of a looser 
structure of a united Europe as a threat (hence the government’s disillusionment with the 
Danish referendum’s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992). Yet, this strategy was also 
predicated on the assumption that anchoring Italy securely within a federated Europe would 
result in a painless compliance of the country itself with the requirements of closer 
integration. The strategy also assumed that Italy was essential to the achievement of political 
and economic union. The debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the prospects of a ’two 
speed’ Europe, the currency crisis of the Autumn 1992 which resulted in the exit of the lira 
from the EMS, shattered the latter assumption.55 The continued procrastination of DC-led 
governments, furthermore, showed that Italy was unlikely to achieve the political and 
economic modernisation essential to reaching the Community average without the removal 
from power of the ’regime-party’ itself. The DC, in other words, was revealed to be hoist on 
its own European petard.
CONCLUSION: ’FLAWED’ EUROPEANISM AND ITS FUTURE
If, as this paper has argued, the DC’s ’flawed Europeanism’ has been a product of its nature 




























































































not be long in forthcoming. The past two years have witnessed unprecedented changes in 
Italian politics as a result of the transformation of the PCI into a non-communist party of the 
left and the exposure of a systematic network of corruption practised by Italian political 
parties, and particularly the DC. These changes have resulted in the demise of the DC regime 
and an attempt by the party to change itself fundamentally (even to the point of abandoning 
its name and returning to its predecessor’s name, the Italian Popular Party, PPI).56 Whether 
the changes to both the state and the party will be completely carried through or whether a 
large part of their reforming element will be absorbed by the DC and other members of the 
political elite remains open to question. But the prospect of the DC losing office after the next 
election is a real one, and, if this were to happen, the party would be, for the first time in the 
post-war period, free - or forced - to develop its Europeanism as a party of opposition rather 
than as a ’permanent’ party of government. While this should not result in any change at the 
official and rhetorical level in its enthusiasm and support for European union, the party will 
nevertheless be freed of responsibility for its lack of concrete action in various areas to further 
the cause of a united Europe; and a subsequent return to office without its ’regime-party’ 
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